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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(c), Plaintiff/Appellee Cynthia 
Gines ("Gines") submits her Reply Brief herein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
Appellant Ingersoll-Rand ("I-R") suggests that the definition 
of fault found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) extends "to any act 
or omission which proximately causes damages." See, Defendants 
Reply Brief at p.l. I-R argues from this that an employer's 
conduct may thus be considered as "fault" even though an employer 
can have no fault. See, Gines primary brief at p.11. 
Aside from the obvious inconsistency in suggesting that one 
without fault may nevertheless fit within the definition of fault, 
this interpretation is inaccurate. Section 37(2) defines "fault" 
as "any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission... ." 
Thus, to be "fault" the breach of duty, act or omission must be 
actionable. In other words, it must be capable of forming the 
basis for an action at law. This interpretation is buttressed by 
the examples of claims contemplated in that section (negligence, 
strict liability, etc.), all of which may be the basis for an 
action for damages. 
1 
I-R's argument that "fault" may encompass fault-free conduct 
which cannot be the basis for an action not only defies logic and 
common sense, it subverts the plain language and intent of this 
section. 
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
I-R challenges Gines' depiction of the intent behind the 
enactment of this Act by attacking Mr. Lloyd's affidavit. While 
it is true the Mr. Lloyd is not a legislator
 f his affidavit 
demonstrates his direct and significant participation in the 
legislative process on behalf of the largest entity interested in 
the issue of employer immunity: the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah. I-R's suggestion that the views of one having such direct 
involvement be discounted because he is "only" a lobbyist1 asks 
this Court to ignore a source with the greatest knowledge and 
assistance.2 
Be that as it may, Defendant ignores the best indicator of 
legislative intent — the actions of the legislature itself. Its 
modification of the language of proposed Section 39 (Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-39) to eliminate from consideration by the jury the fault 
1See, I-R Reply Brief at P.2. 
2This Court undoubtedly recognizes that lobbyists are an 
essential part of the legislative process without whose input and 
assistance much legislation would not be possible. 
2 
attributable to "each other person whose fault contributed to the 
injury or damages"3 is the strongest indication of the legislative 
intent possible. It clearly shows that fault of non-parties is not 
to be considered or compared. 
III. LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
I-R's persistent reference to the law of other jurisdictions 
is of little avail. Each of those decisions interpreted statutes 
using language different from Utah's, in the context of worker's 
compensation statutes different from Utah's and in circumstances 
where the legislative intent supported the courts' conclusions. 
The issue before the Court today requires interpretation of 
Utah law, in the context of Utah's worker's compensation 
legislation by reference to the unambiguous language of this 
statute and the clear legislative intent behind it. 
Defendant's reliance on the law of other jurisdictions is 
misplaced and provides little support for the interpretation it 
seeks. 
3Proposed Section 39 permitted the jury to determine the 
proportionate fault "attributable to each person seeking recovery, 
to each defendant, and to each other person whose fault contributed 
to the injury or damages." As enacted, Section 39 provides only 
that the jury shall determine the proportionate fault "attributable 
to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant." 
3 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT. 
I-R's reading of the constitutional prohibition against 
"piecemeal" abrogation of actions for wrongful death is 
unreasonably narrow. See, Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5; Mai an 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 667 (Utah 1984). This constitutional 
protection prevents both abrogation of rights of action and 
statutory limitation. Id. The interpretation of this Act urged by 
defendant both abrogates and unreasonably limits recovery for 
wrongful death in the industrial setting. 
Defendant contends that this Court's concern over piecemeal 
abrogation relates only to differing effects of legislation on 
different classes of persons. See, I-R Reply Brief at 6. If that 
is so, the Court's concern is properly directed at the untoward 
effect of the statutory interpretation urged by Defendant, as it 
would unfairly impact one class of wrongful death plaintiffs — 
those who have lost their decedent in industrial accidents. 
The interpretation proposed by defendant would treat claims 
for industrial deaths quite differently than those for wrongful 
deaths in other circumstances. The interpretation urged by 
defendant would reduce the available recovery to the damaged 
parties by allocation of fault to the employer who cannot, by 
operation of law, be required to answer in damages. This statutory 
limitation would occur without justification or a substitute 
4 
benefit. The interpretation urged by defendant contravenes the 
constitutional prohibition of Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5 and 
cannot be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory language clearly and unambiguously precludes 
consideration of an employer's "fault." Any other construction 
runs counter to the language and intent of the statute and the 
protections of Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5. This Court should 
conclude that the employer's conduct may not be considered by the 
jury. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May, 1992. 
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